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Information security — Digital signatures with appendix —

Part 4: Stateful hash-based mechanisms

Sécurité de l'information — Signatures digitales avec appendice —

Partie 4: Mécanismes basés sur le hachage dynamique

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Foreword

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Introduction

Digital signatures with appendix are designed to offer integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. ISO/IEC 14888-2 specifies the class of digital signature mechanisms in which the security is based on the difficulty of integer factorization. ISO/IEC 14888-3 specifies the class in which the security is based on computing discrete logarithms. Unfortunately, if and when a large-scale general purpose quantum computer becomes available, all of these techniques will no longer be secure for practical key sizes.[1]

This document specifies a class of digital signatures whose security depends only on the security of the underlying hash function. At the time of publication of this document, standardized hash functions are believed to be secure even against attacks using large scale quantum computers. Hence, the schemes specified in this document do not suffer from the same problems as the schemes specified in ISO/IEC 14888-2 and ISO/IEC 14888-3.

The hash-based signature (HBS) schemes specified in this document are stateful schemes, whereby the private key is part of the state of the scheme. This means that at every signature generation, state information held by the signer must be updated, as otherwise the security of the scheme is compromised. Therefore, when deploying any of the schemes specified in this document, it is expected that robust state-management practices are implemented to ensure that state information is correctly updated.

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Information security — Digital signatures with appendix —

Part 4:
Stateful hash-based mechanisms

1 Scope

This document specifies stateful digital signature mechanisms with appendix, where the level of security is determined by the security properties of the underlying hash function.

This document also provides requirements for implementing basic state management, which is needed for the secure deployment of the stateful schemes described in this document.

2 Normative references

There are no normative references in this document.

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp

— IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/

3.1
authentication path
list of hash values that show that a specific node belongs to a *Merkle tree* (3.5)

3.2
balanced binary tree
ordered tree in which each node has exactly two other nodes that are directly subordinate

3.3
binary tree
ordered tree in which each node has at most two other nodes that are directly subordinate

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC-2382:2015, 2121636, modified — notes to entry have been removed.]

3.4
L-tree
unbalanced *binary tree* (3.3) used to compress the Winternitz+ One-Time Signature Scheme (WOTS+) public keys in the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS)

3.5
Merkle tree
balanced binary tree (3.2), where each node of the tree corresponds to the hash of the labels of the child nodes

3.6
one-time signature
digital signature scheme where the security is limited to signing a single message for a given key pair

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