RTCA RR-007-2025 PDF

RTCA RR-007-2025 PDF

Report on Information Security Management System (ISMS) for Aviation Organizations

$108.00 $216.00 -50%
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Product Code: RTCA RR-007
Stock In Stock
Edition: 25#
Published: 09/08/2025
Number of Pages: 142
File Size: 1 file, 2 Bytes

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PDF ONLY Aviation Organizations: There is already guidance for ISMS under International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001. However, that guidance is focused on ground-based IT systems and business risk. It does not provide the coverage needed for aviation organizations and safety risk. Therefore, this report is established for aviation organizations so that they can show compliance with Part-IS and provide consistent security solutions throughout the aviation ecosystem. Information Security with Safety Impact: The scope of this report is to uncover areas where information security risk can impact safety. ISMS can interface with the existing SMS with safety as the priority. Aviation Stakeholders: There is a diverse set of aviation organizations under Part-IS and the aviation ecosystem in general. Chapter 6 will cover considerations for different aviation stakeholders. These stakeholders include design, manufacturing, maintenance, airlines/operators, airports, training organizations, and Air Traffic Management / Air Navigation Systems (ATM/ANS). The scope will be different based on the individual company. Since this impacts all aviation stakeholders, there may be an overlap in coverage, e.g. operators and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). There are shared and/or shifted responsibilities between organizations such as OEM and Operators. See Part-IS OR.205(b) and Chapter 6 of this document. The operator does not have control over certified aspects or risk assessment done under certification. However, the operator may perform risk assessment as part of other regulations like those from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) or compliance to Part-IS. There are also different considerations for large versus small organizations. Each organization can document these caveats and how they address the objectives. Legacy and e-Enabled: Both legacy aircraft and e-enabled aircraft (airplanes equipped with advanced technologies that allow for real-time communication and data transfer between the aircraft and ground stations), present their own unique security architecture. The scope covered in this report should include systems that support them both, e.g. ground systems. There is security risk with legacy aircraft, though it will be different from that of e-enabled. There should be secure software distribution, weight and balance calculations, etc. regardless of aircraft type. OEMs and avionics manufacturers want to protect their design data. Certification: This document does not address the aspects of information security within aircraft certification, avionics system certification, or airworthiness approvals. That is already covered via the RTCA/EUROCAE airworthiness security standards: ED-202B/DO-326B Airworthiness Security Process Specification, ED-203A/DO-356A Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations, and ED-204A/DO-355A Information Security Guidance for Continuing Airworthiness. Operational Disruptions: Operational disruptions impacting an organization need to be considered for safety impact. The potential impacts of disruptions of ATM organizations are one example and are therefore in scope. PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to provide guidance in addressing a management system for Information Security which complements the current Safety Management System. Globally, this is also in response to the desire for consistent information security solutions across the supply chain. This report identifies selected best practices for securing the aviation ecosystem, ensure consistency and minimum information security throughout the supply chain, and establish common understanding for easing audit overhead on all stakeholders. The best practices for securing aviation are expected to be suitable for addressing information security risks in the aviation sector and to be considered by European Union Aviation Safety Agency’s (EASA) as a means of compliance for Part-IS. Aviation organizations may want to apply the best practices in this report to other regulations and business processes that are relevant to the aviation sector. While business risk management is not included in the scope, these organizations are welcome to extend these processes. Part-IS The European Union (EU) introduced Part-IS through several regulatory vehicles (EU 2022/1645, EU 2023/203, EU 2023/1769, and EU 2024/1109). Part-IS applies to aviation organizations approved either by EASA or EASA Member State Civil Aviation Authorities only. In other jurisdictions, including the United States, regulatory authorities have not issued requirements for an ISMS. References to Part-IS in this document only apply to Part-IS within the European regulatory framework. The regulations define the requirement for an Information Security Management System (ISMS) for aviation safety both for the aviation industry and for the authorities assigned for the oversight authorities of Part-IS in the industry. Part-IS is applied to competent authorities and approved organizations via either an Implementing Rule or a Delegated Rule. The vehicle is dependent on the type of organization, but the rule itself is equal to all organizations. According to the European rulemaking process for aviation, regulations need to be accompanied by material to assist the implementation of the regulations and ensure consistent and fair finding of compliance. This material is categorized into two groups: Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) are non-binding. The AMC serves as a means by which the requirements contained in the regulations can be met. However, applicants may decide to show compliance with the requirements using other means. Both Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) and organizations may propose alternative means of compliance. ‘Alternative Means of Compliance’ are those that propose an alternative to an existing AMC. Those Alternative Means of Compliance proposals need to be accompanied by evidence of their ability to meet the intent of the Implementing Rule (IR). Use of an existing AMC gives the user the benefit of compliance with the IR. Guidance Material (GM) is non-binding explanatory and interpretation material on how to achieve the requirements contained in the Regulations, and the AMCs. It contains information, including examples, to assist the user in the interpretation and application of the Regulations and the AMCs. EASA and the European Commission have introduced sector specific information security requirements ensuring that aviation safety is not impacted by information security. This report is intended to be developed into a full standard that will be proposed as providing an Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material. Until such material is fully developed and accepted, the AMC and GM published by EASA may be used in combination with this report. The terms information security and cyber security are sometimes used interchangeably but cyber security may also be limited to embedded systems. Information security is the term for the discipline and is more encompassing for all domains securing electronic systems – including enterprise information technology, operational technology and embedded systems. Information security is the established term for aviation as used by EASA AMC 20-42 and Opinion 03/2021. For this reason, only the term information security will be used except where cybersecurity is part of a document title. Supply Chain Security Civil aviation has both an enormously complex and globally connected supply chain. As such, civil aviation’s supply chain continuously poses a great risk to the security of the aviation industry as it allows multiple points for malicious actors, including both externally motivated and insider threats, to subvert the activities of an organization for its products and services. For Part-IS, it is important to consider that civil aviation industry attacks can impact nearly everything in the supply chain. This includes the electronic components – the software and firmware of Complex Electronic Hardware (CEH) running in products or powering servers providing services in addition to the electronic hardware itself. This also includes the data used to build physical structures as well as the data and production systems used to manufacture non-electronic components such as structural items. For purposes of this report, the supply chain ecosystem encompasses acquisition or delivery of data and information, including software and Information Technology (IT) related services, and non-physical goods and services such as software, firmware, data and cloud applications from external companies to an organization. The provider of ISMS activities needs to demonstrate that their services ensure the organization complies with Part-IS or any other applicable regulation and agree to audits by the Competent Authority. Contracting Part-IS activities (as detailed in IS.OR.235, Contracting of information security management activities) involves outsourcing specific information security tasks, such as risk assessments, incident response planning, or the management of secure systems, to third-party providers. The focus is on ensuring these providers align with organizational ISMS (Information Security Management Systems) and regulatory frameworks like Part-IS. Such contracts specify the provider's roles, deliverables, and performance criteria, emphasizing compliance with aviation safety standards. In contrast, supply chain information security addresses the broader risks posed by all suppliers, emphasizing securing dependencies in systems, processes, and data interactions. It focuses on ensuring that suppliers’ practices do not introduce vulnerabilities, requiring assessments, audits, and continuous monitoring. Unlike contracted information security activities, which can be scoped and specialized, supply chain information security involves the systemic application of controls across diverse supplier relationships, reflecting its interconnected nature. Organizations need to independently assess their supply chains' information security implications, align supplier practices with Part-IS requirements, and address risks proportional to their impact on aviation safety. Information Security Risk Assessment for Part-IS An information security risk assessment identifies and assesses the risks for information assets from information security threats. Scenarios typically consist of an information security threat, an information asset, a threat vector exposing the information asset to the threat, and a threat condition triggered on the information asset. Threat conditions are commonly expressed as the loss of a security attribute (confidentiality, integrity, availability) which is associated with an impact for the assessing organization. Part-IS risk assessments study impacts on aviation safety and bring two important extensions to this basic concept: (1) The link between the information security threat condition and the safety consequence can be conveyed through a functional chain. (2) The functional chain can span across several organizations. In consequence, the safety impact can occur delayed and/or within a different organization than the organization responsible for the compromised information asset. There can also be risk mitigating measures on the functional chain that reduce the risk for a safety effect but activate after the information asset compromise. For example, an unstable part produced from compromised production data can be rejected in a quality test down the production chain.

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RTCA RR-007-2025 PDF

RTCA RR-007-2025 PDF

$108.00 $216.00