Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - Requirements for emergency response facilities
Introduction: a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of the Standard The Fukushima-Daiichi accident has shown that extremely severe hazards can occur for which a nuclear power plant has not been designed to resist. In such situations, the plant has possibly to cope with one or several damaged reactors, and associated radioactive releases, but also has to cope with the loss of a major part of the electrical sources, cooling functions and I&C, possibly including the Main Control Room (MCR), as well as with difficulties in accessing the site. Providing safe on-site facilities for managing such an emergency is hence a major issue. An international consensus has emerged to promote the design and installation of a specific set of facilities aiming at coordinating the efforts of personnel charged with controlling the emergency activities and those of authorities external to the site charged with protecting the population and the environment. These facilities are called the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF). Different countries, utilities and nuclear power plants have different geographical and infrastructure characteristics and different requirements under emergency situations. However, the same fundamentals apply in terms of both on-site and off-site requirements. The IAEA requirements for emergency response are addressed in SSR-2/1 and GSR Part 7. Informative Annex A provides the more relevant extracts from these two IAEA publications. Figure 1 below illustrates the most import
Scope: This document presents the requirements for the on-site emergency response facilities (referred to hereinafter as the “ERF”) which are to be used in case of incidents or accidents occurring on the associated Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The ERF consists of the Emergency Response Centre (ERC), the Technical Support Centre (TSC) and the Operational Support Centre (OSC), as shown in Figure 1. It establishes requirements for the ERF features and ERF I&C equipment to: coordinate on-site operational efforts with respect to safety and radioprotection; optimize the design in terms of environment control, lighting, power supplies and access control of the ERF; enhance the identification and resolution of potential conflicts between the traditional operational means and emergency means (MCR/SCR and ERF, operating staff and emergency teams, operational procedures and emergency procedures); aid the identification and the enhancement of the potential synergies between the traditional operational means and emergency means. This document is intended for application to new nuclear power plants whose conceptual design is initiated after the publication of this document, but it may also be used for designing and implementing ERF in existing nuclear power plants or in any other nuclear facility. Detailed equipment design is outside the scope of this document. This document does not define the situations (reactor plant conditions, hazards and magnitudes of hazards) leading to mobilisation of emergency response teams and activation / use of the ERF. These aspects are usually addressed in the NPP Emergency Plan. However, the need for consistency of the ERF design and operation with the NPP Emergency Plan is within scope.
Contents:
- FOREWORD
- INTRODUCTION
- Scope