IEC 62340-2007 PDF

IEC 62340-2007 PDF

Nuclear power plants-Instrumentation and control systems important to safety-Requirements for coping with common cause failure (CCF)

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Product Code: IEC 62340
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Edition: 1.0
Published: 12/2007
Number of Pages: 50
File Size: 1 file, 1010 Bytes

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Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety – Requirements for coping with common cause failure (CCF)

Introduction: a) Background, main issues and organisation of this Standard In order to achieve a high safety level, redundancy is applied as one of the key features for designing instrumentation and control systems (I&C systems) important to safety. Since a Common Cause Failure (CCF) could compromise the effectiveness of redundancy, it is essential to take adequate measures against it. The nuclear industry has pioneered systems design and engineering to address CCF. Over the last thirty years it has implemented and reached consensus on a number of practices to handle and overcome CCF. The intention of this standard is to address the whole scope of aspects to overcome Common Cause Failures (CCFs) and to provide an overview of the relevant requirements for I&C systems that are used to perform functions important to safety (according to IEC 61226) in nuclear power plants. b) Situation of the current Standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series IEC 62340 is a second level IEC SC 45A document tackling the issue of CCF. This international standard supplements IEC 61513 and related standards with requirements to reduce and overcome the possibility of CCF of I&C functions of category A. The requirements given by this standard are applicable to category A (IEC 61226) functions if their failure would be unacceptable with respect to the plant safety design. For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this introduction. c) Recommendations and limi

Scope: I&C systems important to safety may be designed using conventional hard-wired equipment, computer-based equipment or by using a combination of both types of equipment. This International Standard provides requirements and recommendations1 for the overall architecture of I&C systems, which may contain either or both technologies. The scope of this standard is: a) to give requirements related to the avoidance of CCF of I&C systems that perform category A functions; b) to additionally require the implementation of independent I&C systems to overcome CCF, while the likelihood of CCF is reduced by strictly applying the overall safety principles of IEC SC 45A (notably IEC 61226, IEC 61513, IEC 60880 and IEC 60709); c) to give an overview of the complete scope of requirements relevant to CCF, but not to overlap with fields already addressed in other standards. These are referenced. This standard emphasises the need for the complete and precise specification of the safety functions, based on the analysis of design basis accidents and consideration of the main plant safety goals. This specification is the pre-requisite for generating a comprehensive set of detailed requirements for the design of I&C systems to overcome CCF. This standard provides principles and requirements to overcome CCF by means which ensure independence2: a) between I&C systems performing diverse safety functions within category A which contribute to the same safety target; b) between I&C systems performing different functions from different categories if e.g. a category B function is claimed as back-up of a category A function and; c) between redundant channels of the same I&C system. The implementation of these requirements leads to various types of defence against initiating CCF events. Means to achieve protection against CCF are discussed in this standard in relation to: a) susceptibility to internal plant hazards and external hazards; b) propagation of physical effects in the hardware (e.g. high voltages); and c) avoidance of specific faults and vulnerabilities within the I&C systems notably: 1) propagation of functional failure in I&C systems or between different I&C systems (e.g. by means of c

Contents:

  • FOREWORD
  • INTRODUCTION
  • Scope

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IEC 62340-2007 PDF

IEC 62340-2007 PDF

$100.88 $201.76