Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems – Requirements for coordinating safety and cybersecurity
Introduction: a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of this standard I&C systems have evolved during the last decades from non-digital equipment and stand- alone environments to digital technologies and interconnected systems. Such an evolution exposes them to risks related to cyberattacks. In addition to well-established safety-oriented provisions, more recent cybersecurity requirements and controls now apply to the same systems. A normative framework is needed to master the interactions and potential side- effects when safety and cybersecurity provisions converge on the same I&C systems and architectures, taking into account the nuclear I&C specifics and the SC 45A related standards. This standard specifically focuses on the issue of requirements for coordinating safety and cybersecurity provisions for I&C programmable digital systems and architectures. It defines both generic principles and guidance for practical situations to integrate cybersecurity requirements in nuclear I&C architectures and systems, fundamentally tailored for safety. Technical but also conceptual, organizational and procedural aspects are covered. It is intended that this standard be used by designers and operators of nuclear power plants (NPPs) (utilities), systems evaluators, vendors and subcontractors, and by licensors. b) Situation of the current standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series IEC 62859 is at the second level of the IEC SC 45A standard series. It is to be considered
Scope: This document provides a framework to manage the interactions between safety and cybersecurity for nuclear power plant (NPP) systems, taking into account the current SC 45A standards addressing these issues and the specifics of nuclear I&C programmable digital systems. NOTE In this document (as in IEC 62645), cybersecurity relates to prevention of, detection of, and reaction to malicious acts perpetrated by digital means (cyberattacks). In this context, it does not cover considerations related to non-malevolent actions and events such as accidental failures, natural events or human errors (except those degrading cybersecurity). Those aspects are of course of prime importance but they are covered by other SC 45A documents and standards, and are not considered as cybersecurity related in this document. This document establishes requirements and guidance to: integrate cybersecurity provisions in nuclear I&C architectures and systems, which are fundamentally tailored for safety; avoid potential conflicts between safety and cybersecurity provisions; aid the identification and the leveraging of the potential synergies between safety and cybersecurity. This document is intended to be used for designing new NPPs, or modernizing existing NPPs, throughout I&C programmable digital systems lifecycle. It is also applicable for assessing the coordination between safety and cybersecurity of existing plants. It may also be applicable to other types of nuclear facilities. This document addresses I&C programmable digital systems important to safety and I&C programmable digital systems not important to safety. It does not address programmable digital systems dedicated to site physical security, room access control and site security surveillance. This document is limited to I&C programmable digital systems of NPPs, including their on-site maintenance and configuration tools. Annex A provides a rationale for and comments about the scope definition and the document application, in particular about the exclusions and limitations previously mentioned. This document comprises three normative clauses: Clause 5 deals with the overall I&C architecture; Clause 6 focuses on the system level;
Contents:
- FOREWORD
- INTRODUCTION
- Scope