Nuclear Power plants – Instrumentation and control systems – Use of formal security models for I&C security architecture design and assessment
Introduction: a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of the Standard Over the last twenty years, Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems for nuclear facilities and Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) have progressed from using hard-wired, mostly analogue components to the versatile mostly digital systems. This progression to digital systems have enhanced design flexibility, and provides for increased acquisition of system performance data but also introduces susceptibility to cyber-attacks for the system itself and nuclear facility as a whole. The generally recognized solution of the I&C NPP security provision problem is to define security requirements as early as possible during the life cycle of the I&C system. These requirements are mapped into the appropriate system’s architecture and security measures (controls) during the design stage. However, in practice, security controls are often introduced only at the final stages of system development. It may lead to a “disagreement” between system architecture and security controls that presumably make the application of implemented measures ineffective. On a technical view, the problem may be represented as a set of particular issues, such as asset classification, selection, and assignment of security controls providing protective barrier measures against cyber-attacks, arrangement of information links between assets, etc. Current I&C NPPs security development practice addresses these issues. The work [1]1 deals with assets classific
Scope: The TR provides an overview over the formalized modelling and designing of cybersecure architectures to apply for I&C system cybersecurity enforcement at NPPs. The plant-specific risk assessment can use the techniques covered by this TR. The formal security models are often used in the analysis and design of I&C security architectures. A formal security model is a mathematical notation such as algebra and set theory or logical expression that defines the security properties of a system and the relationships between different components. It provides a rigorous way to reason about the security of a system and to identify potential vulnerabilities and threats. This document considers the complex problem of NPP I&C architecture synthesis to address particular issues: asset classification, barrier measures assignment, the information transfer and links conformity with security requirements. This document provides guidance on creating a comprehensive security model applicable to NPP I&C systems that describes NPP I&C cybersecurity architecture and aids in accomplishing the main tasks of I&C system secure design, which are: specification of system designs with increased determinism that enhance security, mapping of the security requirements into the security architecture of the I&C system, definition of the security requirements for information exchange between components within the I&C system, operators and other systems, assistance in the determination of the security degree assignment with a model-based technique considering asset properties and formal grouping of the assets, design and establishment of security zones boundaries. These tasks are closely related with the I&C NPP security framework established by IEC 62645 [2] and implement the Secure by Design principle (SeBD) [3]. This document presents the following limitations. The presented methods of the security modelling rely on the following properties of the I&C system: a) The system is built upon the hierarchical principle, the hierarchy exists both at the level of functional system architecture (subsystems, software and hardware components etc.) and at the security architecture level (degrees and zones); b
Contents:
- FOREWORD
- INTRODUCTION
- Scope