Information technology — Performance testing of biometric template protection schemes
Introduction: In conventional biometric recognition systems, an adversary who compromises an enrolment database may gain access to the initial biometric data of the individuals enrolled therein. This is undesirable because, if the biometric system is vulnerable to presentation attacks or replay attacks, the adversary could impersonate an individual and gain access to the system after gaining access to the enrolment database. Furthermore, if the biometric enrolment databases contain unprotected templates and the same biometric modality is adopted in multiple applications, the adversary could link the accounts of the individual across those applications (cross-matching). NOTE to avoid confusion with concepts such as generative AI, the wording “generative biometric data” has been replaced by “initial biometric data”. Other terms such as generated or input were considered, but the experts chose initial. A biometric template stored in an enrolment database is a reference set of biometric features derived from the biological and behavioural characteristics of an individual. If the system implementation allows it, a biometric enrolment that is known to have been compromised may be revoked and renewed a limited number of times. However, the number of unique biometrics that can be extracted from an individual is limited and thus biometric enrolments cannot be revoked and then re-issued an unlimited number of times like new credit card numbers or passwords. The compromise of biometric enrolment reco
Scope: This document supports evaluation of the accuracy, secrecy, and privacy of biometric template protection schemes. It establishes definitions, terminology, and metrics for stating the performance of such schemes. Particularly, this document establishes requirements for the measurement and reporting of: — theoretical and empirical accuracy of biometric template protection schemes, — theoretical and empirical probability of a successful attack on biometric template protection schemes (single or multiple), and — the biometric information leaked when one or more biometric template protection schemes are compromised. This document also gives guidance on measuring and reporting diversity and unlinkability of templates. This document does not: — establish template protection schemes; — address testing of traditional encryption schemes.