RTCA DO-396 VOLUME I & II-2022 PDF
Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Airborne Collision Avoidance System sXu (ACAS sXu)
- 3A-3-A Sanitary Standards
- 9000-9000 Store
- A3-Association for Advancing Automation
- A4A-Airlines for America
- AA-The Aluminum Association
- AAMI-Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation
- AASHTO-American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
- AATCC-American Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists
- ABCB-Australian Building Codes Board
- ABMA-American Bearing Manufacturers Association
- ABMA-BOILER-American Boiler Manufacturers Association
- ACC-American Chemistry Council
- ACGIH-American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
- ACI-American Concrete Institute
- AEIC-Association of Edison Illuminating Companies
- AES-Audio Engineering Society
- AFCEN-French Association
- AGA-American Gas Association
- AGMA-American Gear Manufacturers Association
- AHAM-Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers
- AHP-American Herbal Pharmacopoeia
- AHRI-Air-Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute (formerly ARI)
- AIA-Aerospace Industries Association
- AIAA-American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
- AICHE-American Institute of Chemical Engineers
- AIHA-American Industrial Hygiene Association
- AISC-American Institute of Steel Construction
- ALI-American Ladder Institute
- ALPEMA-Aluminium Plate-Fin Heat Exchanger Manufacturers' Association
- AMCA-Air Movement and Control Association
- ANS-American Nuclear Society
- ANSI-American National Standards Institute
- ANSI/ANSLG-American National Standards Institute / American National Standard Lighting Group
- ANSI/NEMA-American National Standards Institute / National Electrical Manufacturers Association
- ANSI/TCNA-Tile Council of North America, Inc.
- ANSI/UAMA-Unified Abrasives Manufacturers' Association
- API-American Petroleum Institute
- APWA-American Public Works Association
- AREMA-American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association
- ARINC-ARINC Industry Activities
- ARMY-United States Army Publication
- AS-Standards Australia
- ASA-Acoustical Society of America Standards
- ASABE-American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers (Formerly ASAE)
- ASCE-American Society of Civil Engineers
- ASD-STAN prEN-ASD-STAN Standardization
- ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering
- ASHRAE-American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers
- ASIS-ASIS International
- ASM-ASM International
- ASME-ASME International
- ASNT-The American Society for Nondestructive Testing
- ASQ-American Society for Quality
- ASSE (Plumbing)-American Society of Sanitary Engineering
- ATIS-The Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
- ASTM-ASTM International
- AVIXA-Audiovisual and Integrated Experience Association
- AWC-American Wood Council
- AWI-Architectural Woodwork Institute
- AWS-American Welding Society
- AWWA-American Water Works Association
- AWPA-American Wood Protection Association
- B11-B11 Standards, Inc.
- BHMA-Builders Hardware Manufacturers Association
- BICSI-BICSI, A Telecommunications Association
- BioWorld-Thomson Reuters BioWorld
- BMI-Battelle - Metallic Materials Properties Development and Standardization (MMPDS)
- BS-BSI Group
- CAN/CGSB-Canadian General Standards Board
- CAN/ULC-Underwriters Laboratories of Canada
- CEI-Comitato Elettrotecnico Italiano
- CFR-Code of Federal Regulations
- CGA-Compressed Gas Association
- CIE-Commission Internationale de L'Eclairage
- CII-Construction Industry Institute
- CISPR-International Special Committee on Radio Interference
- CLSI-Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute
- CMAA-Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.
- CRANE-Crane Co.
- CRSI-Concrete Reinforcing Steel Institute
- CSA-Canadian Standards Association
- CTA-Consumer Technology Association (Formerly CEA)
- CTI-Cooling Technology Institute
- DANSK-Dansk Standard
- DID-Data Item Description
- DIN-Deutsches Institut Fur Normung E.V. (German National Standard)
- DNV-DNV
- DOD-Department of Defense
- DOXPUB-Doxpub, Inc.
- DVS-DEUTSCHER VERBAND FÜR SCHWEISSEN UND VERWANDTE VERFAHREN E.V.
- ECIA-Electronic Components Industry Association
- EEC-European Union Directives
- EEMUA-Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association
- ESD-EOS/ESD Association, Inc.
- ETSI-European Telecommunications Standards Institute
- FCI-Fluid Controls Institute
- ISO-International Organization for Standardization
- ISO/IEC/IEEE-International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission / Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
- ISPE-International Society for Pharmaceutical Engineering
- FED-Federal Specifications and Standards
- ISTA-International Safe Transit Association
- ISUZU-Isuzu Motors Ltd.
- FM Approvals-FM Approvals
- JEDEC-JEDEC Solid State Technology Association
- JSA-Japanese Standards Association (JIS Standards)
- LIA-Laser Institute of America
- FORD-Ford Motor Company
- MBMA-Metal Building Manufacturers Association
- MCGRAW-HILL-McGraw-Hill Publishing Company
- FRPI-Fiberglass Reinforced Plastics Institute, Inc.
- MIL-Military Specifications and Standards
- MPIF-Metal Powder Industries Federation
- MPMA-Motion + Power Manufacturers Alliance (MPMA) (Formerly AGMA & ABMA)
- GMW-General Motors Worldwide
- MSS-Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valve and Fittings Industry
- NAAMM-National Association of Architectural Metal Manufacturers
- GPA-GPA Midstream Association
- NACE-National Association of Corrosion Engineers
- NADCA-National Air Duct Cleaners Association
- NAS-Aerospace Industries Association - National Aerospace Standard
- HEI-Heat Exchange Institute
- NASA-National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- NBBI-The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors
- NCSL-National Conference of Standards Laboratories International
- HFES-Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
- NECA-National Electrical Contractors Association
- RTCA-RTCA, Inc.
- HI-Hydraulic Institute
- NEMA-National Electrical Manufacturers Association
- NETA-InterNational Electrical Testing Association
- NFPA (Fire)-National Fire Protection Association
- HIR-H.I.R. Technical Services
- NFPA (Fluid)-National Fluid Power Association
- NFSI-National Floor Safety Institute
- HPS-Health Physics Society
- NGA-National Glass Association
- NISO-National Information Standards Organization
- NORSOK-NORSOK
- I3A-International Imaging Industry Association
- NRC-National Research Council Canada
- NSC-Natural Stone Council
- IADC-International Association of Drilling Contractors
- NSF-NSF International
- NZS-Standards New Zealand
- OPEI-Outdoor Power Equipment Institute
- IAPMO-International Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials
- PCI-Precast/Prestressed Concrete Institute
- PDA-Parenteral Drug Association
- IATA-International Air Transport Association
- PEI-Petroleum Equipment Institute
- PFI-Pipe Fabrication Institute
- PIA-Parachute Industry Association
- ICAO-International Civil Aviation Organization
- PIP-Process Industry Practices
- PPI-Plastics Pipe Institute
- ICC-International Code Council
- PTI-Post-Tensioning Institute
- ICEA-Insulated Cable Engineers Association
- ICML-International Council for Machinery Lubrication
- IEC-International Electrotechnical Commission
- IEEE-Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
- IES-Illuminating Engineering Society
- IEST-Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology
- IFI-Industrial Fasteners Institute
- IICRC-Institute of Inspection, Cleaning and Restoration Certification
- INCITS-InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (formerly NCITS)
- INTERN-International Motors, LLC (Formerly NAVISTAR)
- IPC-IPC by Global Electronics Association
- ISA-International Society of Automation
- ISEA-International Safety Equipment Association
- SAE-SAE International
- SAIA-Scaffold & Access Industry Association
- SCTE-Society of Cable Telecommunication Engineers
- SDI-Steel Door Institute
- SES-The Society for Standards Professionals
- SIA-Security Industry Association
- SJI-Steel Joist Institute
- SMACNA-Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association
- SME-Society of Manufacturing Engineers
- SMPTE-Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers
- SN EN-Standards Norway EN
- SPC-Standards Press of China
- SPI-Society of the Plastics Industry
- SSPC-Society for Protective Coatings
- STI/SPFA-Steel Tank Institute/Steel Plate Fabricators Association
- TAPPI-Technical Association of the Pulp and Paper Industry
- TCIA-Tree Care Industry Association
- TEMA-Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association
- THHILL-TH Hill Associates, Inc.
- TIA-Telecommunications Industry Association
- TMS-The Masonry Society
- UL-Underwriters Laboratories
- ULC-Underwriters Laboratories of Canada
- UNE-Asociación Española de Normalización
- WILEY-John Wiley and Sons
- WRC-Welding Research Council, Inc.
- WSPC-World Scientific Publishing Co.
- X9-Accredited Standards Committee X9 Incorporated
Your shopping cart is empty!
Product Description
PURPOSE AND SCOPE Introduction This document sets forth minimum operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System sXu (ACAS sXu) equipment, designed for platforms with a wide range of surveillance technologies and performance characteristics typical of smaller Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS). Incorporated within these standards are system characteristics that should be of value to users, designers, manufacturers, and installers. These characteristics accommodate the requirements of various users. Context Detect and Avoid (DAA) Title 14 of the US Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), Part 91, §91.111(a), §91.113, and §91.181 require “out-the-window” onboard pilot actions to mitigate collision risk and avoid other traffic. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) do not have an onboard pilot to comply with these rules; therefore, UAS operators must find alternatives. The term UAS in this document refers to an aircraft that can be operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft. Furthermore, Part 107 §107.37(a) requires that “small unmanned aircraft must yield the right of way to all aircraft, airborne vehicles, and launch and reentry vehicles.” Some UAS operators use waivers with chase planes and visual ground observers to comply, while others rely on airspace segregation or utilize remote operations to mitigate traffic incursions. However, to enable non-segregated airspace operations in the National Airspace System (NAS), UAS will need better “see and avoid” strategies, such as a DAA system. There are two sets of operating rules for manned aircraft: Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR). UAS cannot conduct VFR operations due to the lack of an onboard pilot. RTCA DO-365B, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Detect and Avoid Systems (Ref. V) defines DAA system minimums that enable UAS transiting through Class B, C, D, E, and G airspace and performing extended operations higher than 400 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) in Class D, E (up to FL 180) and Class G airspace for UAS that can meet prescribed equipage and performance requirements. DO- 365B requires Air Traffic Control (ATC) coordination of caution-level remain well clear (RWC) maneuvers; however, warning-level RWC maneuvers and collision avoidance (CA) maneuvers have no ATC coordination requirement. Since sXu is intended for vehicles that are not transponder-equipped and are not receiving ATC separation services, it is likely that there will be little operational difference based on airspace class for sXu. ACAS sXu Platform Criteria RTCA DO-365B (Ref. V) does “not apply to small UAS (under 55 pounds (lbs)) operating in low-level environments (below 400’) or other segmented areas”. Additionally, some UAS platforms heavier than 55 lbs are unable to meet the equipage and performance requirements of DO-365B. Such platforms are assumed to operate under the provisions of Part 91 or Part 135, as the weight limit of Part 107 is not waivable. Currently, Part 107 only covers small UAS operations below 400 ft within Visual Line of Sight (VLOS). A waiver to Part 107 is needed if a small UAS wants to operate above 400 ft or Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS). Although some small UAS are envisioned to operate under current Part 107 restrictions, many small UAS will need to operate beyond those restrictions to carry out their operators’ business case. DAA equipage is envisioned to be one of the key enablers of small UAS BVLOS operations, as well as small UAS operations above 400 ft. In summary, small UAS are out of scope of DO-365B and need a DAA solution to operate beyond the restrictions of Part 107. ACAS X Background and ACAS sXu Solution ACAS X was developed as a successor to TCAS II (see §1.2.1.1). All ACAS X variants detect conflicts with intruder aircraft and issue alerts and guidance to resolve encounters. They share an underlying common design but have hardware, surveillance, and threat logic tailored for different user groups. ACAS Xa/Xo (defined in RTCA DO-385 (Ref. C)) is intended for the same types of aircraft that historically operated with TCAS II systems. ACAS Xu (defined in RTCA DO-386 (Ref. D)) is a derivative of the ACAS Xa/Xo system, designed for platforms with a wider range of surveillance technologies and performance characteristics, such as UAS. ACAS Xu is a DAA solution that provides both RWC and CA functionality in compliance with RTCA DO-365B (Ref. V). The ACAS Xu for smaller UAS (sXu) concept is a derivative of the ACAS Xu concept, beyond the scope of DO-365B, and provides a DAA capability for smaller UAS (sUAS) operating BVLOS by accepting surveillance sources available to sUAS and adapting to performance requirements unique to their operations. sXu employs a single standard logic across a variety of envisioned equipages and sUAS platform maneuvering characteristics. The core sXu logic is common to all implementations but agnostic to physical architecture, surveillance sources, and communications links. ACAS sXu is specified at the prescriptive algorithm level in these MOPS, and has undergone the rigorous verification and validation process (i.e. hazard analysis, stress testing, safety, and operational validation) associated with its predecessors: TCAS II, ACAS Xa/Xo, and ACAS Xu. Applicability This section describes the qualitative ACAS sXu ownship vehicle criteria that this MOPS supports. Additional details may be found in §1.4.2. While sXu includes no upper weight limit on the UAS platforms that can be equipped with the system, it is important to define the sUAS terminology that is used in this document. “small UAS” are typically defined as unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on takeoff, including everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft. This weight-based definition can be traced to civil aviation authority regulations, such as 14 CFR §107.3 in the United States. However, in this MOPS, the sUAS acronym specifically applies to “smaller UAS”, which are defined as unmanned aircraft with a wingspan, or equivalent, of 25 feet or less. This size-based definition aligns with other international standards, such as ASTM F3442/F3442M-20 (Ref. Y), and research involved in defining appropriate protection volumes (Ref. FF). It is assumed, based on research at the time of publication, that all weight-based "small UAS" have wingspans less than 25 feet and can also be considered "smaller UAS". However, not all "smaller UAS" weigh less than 55 pounds and may not be considered as "small UAS." “smaller UAS” as defined based on size are eligible to use sXu for DAA. Note that the “smaller UAS” definition is meant for just the scope of this MOPS to make it clear what platforms are applicable to sXu and it is not intended to be a new regulatory definition to be applied outside the scope of this MOPS. These criteria do not necessarily correspond to any of the existing or envisaged regulatory UAS-classifications which may not yet be mature and therefore may change. sXu functions at any altitude in which it is permitted to operate by the regulator. However, the performance assessment is limited to the altitude bands described in the OSED (see §A.3.1). Additional sXu applicability distinctions include: o sXu precludes use of transponders and ADS-B Out. o sXu-equipped aircraft do not receive ATC separation services. These distinctions have significant downstream effects on the sXu concept as detailed later in the document, but the key implication is that sXu is not the appropriate ACAS X variant for a manufacturer or operator that anticipates receiving ATC services, equipping with a transponder, or broadcasting ADS-B Out. It would be appropriate, however, for sUAS to receive operational UAS Traffic Management (UTM) services. Document Structure This document is published in two volumes. Section 1 of Volume I provides information needed to understand the rationale for equipment characteristics and requirements stated in the remaining sections. It describes typical equipment applications and operational goals and is the basis for the standards stated in the document. Definitions essential to proper understanding of this document are also provided in Section 1. Section 2 of Volume I contains the minimum performance standards for the equipment. These standards define the required performance under standard operating conditions and stressed physical environmental conditions. It also details bench test procedures that demonstrate compliance, including specific bench tests for the collision avoidance logic performance. Section 3 of Volume I describes the performance required of the installed equipment. Tests for the installed equipment are included when performance cannot be adequately determined through bench testing. Volume II contains the Algorithm Description Document (ADD), which includes prescriptive and suggested detect and avoid algorithms for ACAS sXu. The algorithms are presented in the Julia programming language with informational commentary text. Since the measured values of equipment performance characteristics may be functions of the methods of measurement, standard test conditions and methods of test are recommended in this document. Optional Functionality This MOPS refers to some features that go beyond the minimum required functionality and are considered optional. This section defines the various meanings of this term “optional” in the context of the ACAS sXu system as a whole. Refer to §2.2.1.3 and §2.2.1.4 for identification of and details on all optional functionality. The ACAS sXu logic is described in the ADD (Volume II). All of the algorithms identified in the ADD as prescriptive are to be implemented and tested, including those associated with optional functionality. The Test Suite (see §2.4.2.1) includes tests for these optional features, and the Test Suite needs to be run and passed in its entirety. One sense of “optional” in this document refers to specific features and the usage of the associated sXu logic interfaces. Logic interfaces and algorithms for these features must be implemented and tested but needn’t be used by the broader ACAS sXu system. For example, all V2V algorithms in the ADD must be implemented and tested, but a system implementation with no external interface to receive V2V data is acceptable. Some of these features can be enabled or disabled within the logic via logical flags (see §2.2.3.5.6). An implementer may choose to prevent use of these features by making them unavailable in the external interface to the ACAS sXu system and permanently disabled in the logic. The second sense of “optional” pertains to external data or equipment that supports functionality described above. Continuing the preceding example, a V2V transmitter/ receiver is not required for ACAS sXu. A second example is non-cooperative surveillance: at least one non-cooperative surveillance source is required; additional sources are optional. The final sense of the term “optional” concerns implementation choices internal to the sXu system but external to the sXu logic—to include elements subsequently referred to as Surveillance and the System Monitor Module. The implementer is afforded flexibility where possible to route data from the external system interfaces to sXu logic interface. For example, the implementer may choose to route, with the appropriate data transformations, all non-cooperative surveillance information through the Absolute Geodetic Track logic interface; in this sense, the Ownship-Relative Non-Cooperative Track interface is optional. Requirements on these optional features and implementations are included in Volume I and are identified as optional. If the ACAS sXu system implements an optional feature, it needs to be implemented and tested per this minimum performance specification. Optional features, as distinct from the provisions for potential modification in the next section, have been tested during system development, and performance is detailed in the Operational Validation Report (Ref. S). Provisions for Potential Modifications Volume II, Appendix L contains provisions for potential modifications of specific functionality not required per this MOPS. Some DAA stakeholders have expressed a desire to modify functionality in this MOPS to support an operation or operating mode that is beyond its current scope. Places in the main body of Volume II where modifications might be made to support the incorporation of Appendix L algorithms are labeled with a comment: “# Deviation potential: Refer to ACAS sXu MOPS Vol. I section 1”. The following is the complete list of provisions for potential modifications included in Volume II, Appendix L: • L.1: Descend Inhibit – Allows for modification of altitude thresholds to enable descend inhibits that block down sense advisories, with the exception of DNC (Do Not Climb), below a specified altitude. • L.2: Target Designation – Allows the Remote Pilot in Command (RPIC) to assign special processing to a target aircraft by designating that target (e.g. through the display), as in ACAS Xo. Neither these new algorithms nor any of the suggested modifications to the parameter file is part of the validation and verification effort associated with this MOPS. The algorithms in Volume II, Appendix L are not covered by the Test Suite (§2.4.2.1), or any of the other test procedures in §2.4, and a manufacturer that implements them would need to provide their own safety case to justify a deviation from the minimum specified in these MOPS. In addition to the algorithms in Appendix L, the ADD contains constants, parameters, and data structures that support the provisions for potential modification and are part of the prescriptive minimum implementation. Some examples are the trm_input.intruder.designated_mode field in the STM Report (§2.4.2.1.3.1), the designation field in the TRM Report, the global constant DESIGNATION, and the data type DesignationState. These items exist to support the implementation of potential modification L.2 Target Designation. They are part of the minimum required implementation, included to maintain code commonality among ACAS X variants and to ensure consistent data structures between manufacturers who implement any provisions for potential modifications and those who do not. The Test Suite does not include any specific test cases to exercise these items. (In order to specifically test the items involved in the Target Designation example, the Test Suite would need to provide inputs to ReceiveTargetDesignation in Volume II Appendix L.2, and it does not.) However, since these supporting data structures are included in the ADD, they are indirectly tested by all of the encounters in the Test Suite. Their values must remain constant or zero (e.g. the designation field in the TRM Report) and must match the expected results files in the Test Suite as long as a manufacturer does not implement any of the algorithms in Appendix L. Operational Goals At a minimum, equipment providing this capability must achieve the following operational goals: a. The system must be capable of providing timely and effective DAA alerting and guidance in order to maintain safe separation from other air traffic and satisfy the performance requirement defined in APPENDIX A §A.2.2. Note: In this document the term “separation” means physical separation. b. Operation must be compatible with the existing and currently defined ATC and Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems. c. The system design must ensure that the system does not have characteristics that could adversely affect the safety of flight or interfere with other aircraft systems on the aircraft or installed on other nearby aircraft. d. The system must contain a comprehensive performance monitor function that will monitor automatically, on a continuous basis, the operating integrity of the system. e. The system must operate according to the assumptions and descriptions of the ACAS sXu OSED included in APPENDIX A of this document. f. The system must prioritize avoiding collisions with airborne intruders over collisions with terrain or obstacles. Equipment “ACAS sXu” or “ACAS sXu equipment" as used herein includes all components or units necessary (as determined by the manufacturer or installer) for the equipment to perform its function properly. There are external systems that ACAS sXu is dependent upon that may be standardized in separate documents, but, in each case, these dependencies will be made explicit. It should not be inferred that an ACAS sXu equipment design will necessarily have all components or units in separate packages. This will depend on the specific design chosen by the manufacturer. Additional functions and components that may provide expanded equipment capabilities are identified. Other equipment features that are beyond the scope of this document may be described in future RTCA documents. The sXu DAA Processor manages airspace surveillance data, intruder tracking, threat detection, RA maneuver determination and selection, and generation of advisories. This MOPS does not define display-related requirements, rather it defines outputs that can be used to support potential DAA display concepts and architectures. Similarly, this document does not define automation-related requirements. APPENDIX D has been provided as guidance on adapting DO-365 display requirements for ACAS sXu, and Appendix R of DO-365 provides automation-related considerations (see RTCA DO-365B (Ref. V)). Additional work, which is considered outside the scope of this MOPS, is necessary to determine appropriate display and automation requirements for a particular operational concept or architecture. Since the equipment implementation includes a computer software package, compliance with the guidelines contained in RTCA DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, December 13, 2011, and all revisions thereto (Ref. C), may be required. Compliance with the guidelines contained in RTCA DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, April 19, 2000, and all revisions thereto (Ref. T), may also be required. Appropriate software and hardware certification procedures may vary based on the intended operational environment for ACAS sXu equipment (for example, sXu implementations intended for higher risk operations may require more rigorous software and hardware verification / design assurance , while sXu implementations intended for lower risk operations may require less rigorous software and hardware procedures). The appropriate verification / design assurance should be determined through coordination between the manufacturer and regulator. ACAS sXu supports various equipment configurations such as the examples identified in the System Overview, §1.3. The requirements of this MOPS apply across all envisioned configurations, unless otherwise noted. Operational performance standards for functions or components that refer to equipment capabilities that exceed the stated minimum requirements are identified as optional features. Equipment Classes and Article Designations At the time of the authoring of the MOPS there was insufficient information to define equipment classes. It is expected that a future revision of this MOPS or other certification documents (e.g. TSO) will provide equipment classes aligned with minimum capabilities for specific operational uses. This specification supports meeting the safety targets for the operational environment defined in the OSED (APPENDIX A). Aircraft Equipment Information Vulnerabilities Aircraft equipment information vulnerabilities (such as cybersecurity risks) have been present for digital systems since the development of the Personal Computer (PC) in the late 1970s and even longer for Radio Frequency (RF) systems; the advent of internet connectivity has substantially increased these risks. Internet and Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) connectivity have become popular as a means for aircraft or equipment manufacturers to update installed avionics software, to update databases, etc. In most countries, the State provides oversight of safety-of-flight systems (sometimes referred to as “authorized services”), which provide information to aircraft, such as an Instrument Landing System (ILS), VHF Omnidirectional Range Radar (VOR), Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), to name a few. However, the State typically does not provide oversight on “non-trusted” [1] connectivity such as Wi-Fi or manufacturer-supplied equipment interfaces that permit input of externally supplied data into aircraft systems. A manufacturer may expose aircraft information to vulnerability through equipment design, or introduce vulnerability as a result of being connected to a common interface. Therefore, it is important that manufacturers consider aircraft information security risk mitigation strategies in their equipment design, particularly when the equipment is responsible for an interface between the aircraft and aircraft-external systems. These MOPS do not contain complete requirements aimed at mitigating cyber-security issues. It is recommended that manufacturers implement a layered approach to aircraft information security risk mitigation that includes both technical (e.g., software, signal filtering) and physical strategies. From a technical perspective, for example, this could include signal spoofing detection capabilities and/or more stringent, multi-factored authentication techniques such as passwords, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), and digital certificates. To mitigate the risk of signal spoofing, an ACAS sXu system may be designed to only issue RAs on cooperative surveillance data which has been validated. From a physical perspective, a manufacturer could consider connectors that can be removed only by using special tools to prevent tampering. Finally, manufacturers should consider supply chain risk management; for example, assuring that software code development contractors and their staff are properly vetted. Civil aviation authorities (CAAs) have a regulatory interest when an applicant’s design makes use of a non-trusted connectivity where the installation can potentially introduce aircraft information security vulnerabilities. This requires the applicant to address not only the information security vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques for the new installation, but to also consider how vulnerabilities could propagate to existing downstream systems. Therefore, it is recommended that manufacturers reference their equipment security review for aircraft information and mitigation strategies in the equipment’s installation manual so that the applicant can consider them in meeting the installation regulatory requirements. [1] A “non-trusted” connectivity (sometimes referred to as a third-party system) is any frequency or service where an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) is not providing direct monitoring/protection.



